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You Take My Space, I Take Your Air: An Empirical 
Study of Disabled Parking and Motor Vehicle Laws for 
Persons with Disabilities 
By DONALD H. STONE" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reserved parking and specialized treatment are necessary to permit 
individuals with disabilities access to goods, services, and employment 
opportunities on an equal basis with the general public. Why are disabled 
drivers entitled to disabled parking spots? What is the procedure for an 
individual with a disability to receive special disability registration license 
plates?l What is the role of the Medical Advisory Board in reviewing the 
ability of disabled drivers to get behind the wheel?2 What, if any, obligation 
or responsibility does a physician treating a disabled driver have to notify the 
Department of Motor Vehicles of the patient's condition or to third parties 
injured by a disabled driver?3 
Does the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),4 a landmark 
civil rights act protecting an individual with a physical or mental impairment,5 
require the removal of architectural barriers to create designated accessible 
parking spaces at places of public accommodation? Does the ADA require 
that restaurants, grocery stores, law offices, and laundromats provide 
designated parking for individuals with disabilities? 
Empirical data provided in this article is submitted to serve as a backdrop 
for elaboration and comparison. Fifty places of public accommodation6 were 
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of 
Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Tiffany Rodenberger, a 2006 graduate of the 
University of Baltimore School of Law and Sarah Mann, a law student at the University of Baltimore School 
of Law, for their outstanding legal research in the preparation of this Article. I dedicate this Article to Mr. 
Harold M. Shapiro, my father-in-law who is a Disabled American Veteran entitled to a disabled parking 
privilege, for inspiring the original idea for this Article. 
I. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616.1 (West 2007). 
2. See id. § 13-616.1. 
3. See Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group, WD 58290, 2001 Mo. App. Lexis 353 
(W.O. Mo. Mar. 6, 2001) (reversed by Missouri Supreme Court on other grounds, 58 S.W.3d 519.(Mo. 
2001». 
4. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(I) (2007). The purpose of the Act is to facilitate "the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." [d. 
6. Public accommodation encompasses "a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations 
affect commerce." 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007). 
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surveyed to identify and determine compliance with the provision of accessible 
parking spaces for disabled drivers in a variety of locations in Maryland.7 
A review of a variety of state motor vehicle statutes8 are compared and 
analyzed, ranging from the enumerated covered disabilities, the physician 
certification process, the provision of placards and disability plates, parking 
space requirements fees, parking privileges, and enforcement provisions. 
This article will discuss and analyze various court decisions concerning 
reasonable accommodations for drivers with disabilities. It will provide 
insight and understanding of the impact of the ADA and the direction courts 
are heading as they confront this challenging and important area of the law. 
Finally, this article will offer recommendations regarding accessible parking 
and Medical Advisory for the disabled driver. 
"You take my space, I take your air" was the battle cry within the 
disability movement in the pre-ADA days. Prior to the enactment of the ADA, 
when a disabled person simply wanted a parking space in order to visit a place 
of public accommodation, such as a grocery store or physician's office, there 
was no clear national mandate to provide accessible parking for a person with 
a disability. A segment of the disabled community would comment that if a 
non-disabled individual was bold enough to park in a space reserved for a 
disabled individual, the disabled individual's only recourse was to take the air 
out of the tire of that driver's vehicle. There was no national civil right's act 
designed to protect the disabled and few state laws were designed to provide 
access to the disabled, so self help was the answer in the minds of some 
disabled individuals. Due to growing frustration and limited options, "you take 
my space, I take your air" was the mantra of some in the early stages of the 
disabled movement. Fortunately, the ADA and state laws have stepped in to 
address, for the most part, parking issues facing the disabled driver. 
n. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
The ADA, enacted in 1990, created sweeping reform on the face of 
discrimination law as it protects the rights of persons with disabilities. 
According to 1990 congressional findings, which were the basis of the 
enactment of the ADA, approximately 43 million Americans had at least "one 
or more physical or mental disabilit[y]".9 According to the 2000 U.S. Census 
7. Donald H. Stone, Results of 2005-2006 Disability Parking Survey (results are on file with the 
author). The empirical study included a five-page questionnaire. A blank survey form is provided infra at 
AppendixA. 
8. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 316.1955· 320.084, 
553.5041 (West 2006); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 21458·22511.59 (West 2007); TEx. TRANsp. CODE ANN. §§ 
504.201- 681.003; 625 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/3-616-5111-1301.7(West 2006). 
9. 42 U.S.c. § 12101(a)(I). Congress noted this figure was increasing as the population grew older. 
Id. 
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Data, almost 50 million people, about 19% of all Americans over age five, 
reported having a disability. 10 Almost 42% of the population age sixty-five or 
over reported a disability,lI reflecting the prediction of Congress that the 
number of Americans with one or more physical or mental disability is 
increasing as the population as a whole is growing older. 12 Congress 
acknowledged that society has a tendency "to isolate and segregate individuals 
with disabilities" and that such discrimination "continue[s] to be a serious and 
pervasive social problem.,,13 Discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities persists in many areas, including employment, housing, public 
accommodations, transportation, and access to public services. 14 "Individuals 
with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, 
including . . . the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and 
communication barriers .... "15 Congress also found that the nation's goals for 
"individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency .... "16 The 
ability to drive one's car and park in a convenient and accessible space is 
essential for a disabled driver seeking "the opportunity to compete on an equal 
basis and to pursue opportunities for which our free society is justifiably 
famous .... "17 
The declaration of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.,,18 The stated purpose of the ADA is to furnish "clear, strong, 
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.,,19 According to the 2000 U.S Census data, 21.2 million 
individuals have a physical disability limiting basic physical activities such as 
walking.20 These individuals have the greatest need for accessible parking to 
enable them to participate in and contribute to the community. 
Title ill of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by 
places of public accommodations, including facilities operated by private 
10. JUDITH WALDROP & SHARON M. STERN, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000 2 
(2003). 
II. [d. 
12. See 42 u.s.c. § 121OI(a)(I). 
13. [d. § 121OI(a)(2). 
14. [d. § 121OI(a)(3). 
15. [d. § 121OI(a)(5). 
16. [d. § 121OI(a)(S). 
17. 42 U.S.C. § 121OI(a)(9). 
IS. [d. § 121OI(b)(l). 
19. [d. § 12101 (b)(2). 
20. WALDROP & STERN, supra note 10, at 2. The total number of 21,200,000 people is S.2% of the 
population. [d. at 7. 
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entities whose operations affect commerce. 21 The scope and breadth of the 
ADA brings disabled drivers from parking at a bank, bakery, barber shop, or 
bowling alley, within the watchful eye of the ADA. In order for the disabled 
driver to receive the benefits of such places, it may be necessary to provide 
reasonable accommodations that will make facilities and eligibility criteria 
usable for individuals with disabilities.22 
The importance of accessible and sufficient parking for the disabled 
driver is a crucial prerequisite to access inside the public accommodation. The 
first priority of a public accommodation should be to provide access from 
public sidewalks and parking, including providing accessible parking spaces.23 
The measures are to include providing accessible parking spaces.24 "This 
priority on 'getting through the door' recognizes that providing actual physical 
access to a facility from public sidewalks, public transportation, or parking is 
generally preferable to any alternative arrangements in terms of both business 
efficiency and the dignity of individuals with disabilities.,,25 The importance 
of accessible and sufficient parking for the disabled driver is a crucial 
prerequisite to access inside the public accommodation. The ADA's 
declaration that "[a] public accommodation shall afford goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations to an individual with a 
disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the 
individual .... " is a centerpiece of the law.26 
A dispute often arises between a landlord and tenant in a shopping center 
regarding the responsibility for providing accessible parking. This was the 
case in Fratten v. Barkan, involving three retail merchants, Brooks Pharmacy, 
Papa Gino's and, Fashion Bug, which are located in a plaza owned by 
DeMoulas Supermarkets.27 A disabled person claimed that there were ADA 
architectural barrier violations in the three stores and brought suit against 
DeMoulas as the owner of the premises.28 The court joined the three 
merchants in the action because they had an interest in the question of whether 
the barriers violated the ADA and, if so, whether residual measures were 
21. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007). The places of public accommodation include 12 categories: places 
of lodging, restaurants, theaters, places of public gathering, shopping centers, service establishments, public 
transportation terminals, libraries, parks, social service establishments, and golf courses. [d. 
22. 42 U.S.C. §12111(9). 
23. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(c)(1) (2007). 
24. [d. 
25. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B. 
26. 28 C.F.R. § 36.203(a). 
27. Frotten v. Barkan, 219 FRO. 31, 31-32 (D. Mass. 2(03); see also Botosan v. Paul McNally 
Realty, 216 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2000) (A landlord has independent obligation to comply with ADA that may 
not be eliminated by contract (lease». 
28. Frotren, 219 FRO. at 31-32. 
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readily available.29 The appropriate solution was to join together both the 
landlord of the plaza and the individual merchants with alleged ADA 
violations. This allowed the court to ultimately rule on responsibility of 
architectural accessibility within the plaza, as well as within individual 
merchants' leasing space.30 The court cited the Botoson rule that a "landlord 
has an independent obligation to comply with the ADA that may not be 
eliminated by contract [such as a lease],,,3! 
The fundamental claim of most disabled drivers seeking a parking space 
at a place of public accommodation is the opportunity to participate?2 Casey 
Martin, a professional golfer suffering from a degenerative and progressive 
circulatory disorder in his leg, sought reasonable accommodations in order to 
compete in the Professional Golf Association ("PGA,,).33 Mr. Martin, who 
sought the use of a golf cart while competing in the PGA, asked the Supreme 
Court to decide whether a disabled contestant may be denied the use of a golf 
cart that could "fundamentally alter the nature" of the tournament in allowing 
him to ride when all other contestants must walk. 34 The court was confronted 
with the issue of whether modifications in the policies, practices, or procedures 
were fundamental alterations in the nature of the game of golf. The Supreme 
Court clearly resounded with the statement that a waiver of the walking rule 
would not create a fundamental alteration and Martin was permitted to use a 
golf cart.35 
As the disabled driver simply seeks a place to park, Casey Martin simply 
asked for a reasonable way to move from golf hole to golf hole throughout the 
course. The significance of leveling the playing field for Casey Martin to 
compete is similar to providing a disabled driver an accessible parking space 
to enter the door of the public accommodation open to all citizens.36 
To remove the unnecessary barriers shackling people with disabilities is 
to avail society of the full range of their talents and abilities.37 During 
congressional testimony and deliberation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, individuals provided compelling reasons for the passage of the new 
29. Id. at 32. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 32 (quoting Botosan, 216 F.3d at 833). 
32. See 28 C.F.R. §36.203(b) (2007). 
33. PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). 
34. Id. at 664-65. 
35. Id. at 689-90. 
36. See Donald H. Stone, The Game of Pleasant Diversion: Can we Level the Playing Field for the 
Disabled Athlete and Maintain the National Pastime, In the Aftermath of PGA Tour, Inc v Martin: An 
Empirical Study of the Disabled Athlete, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 377 (2005). 
37. Id. 
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federal disability law. 38 The major reasons why people with disabilities do not 
frequent places of public accommodation include not feeling welcome, fear 
and self-consciousness about their disability, and architectural and 
transportation barriers.39 The provision of safe and abundant parking for the 
disabled driver will open up doors of full opportunity for participation in the 
mainstream of public accessibility. 
Parking for disabled drivers is at a crossroads. States are reviewing the 
rules as they impact disabled drivers.40 The public is claiming misuse of the 
disabled parking rules.41 Older disabled drivers are under greater scrutiny 
regarding safety on the road.42 Specialized parking for the disabled continues 
to be necessary and important as individuals with disabilities continue to seek 
acceptance and understanding.43 
m. STATISTICAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY PARKING SURVEY 
The empirical data contained in this article is provided to serve as a 
backdrop for purposes of elaboration and comparison.44 Fifty places of public 
accommodation45 throughout Maryland46 were surveyed to obtain data on 
38. H.R. REp. No. 101-485, Pt. 2 (1990). 
39. Id. at 316-17. 
40. MD. DEP'T OF TRANsp., A REPORT TO THE MARYLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING TASK 
FORCE ON PARKING FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES (2004), SB 368, Ch. 268 Acts of 2004 (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.marylandmva.comlResourceslDisabilityparkingTFR.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE]. 
41. Jill Rosen, Limits on Disabled-parking Permits Due to Begin, BALT. SUN, Dec. 31. 2005, at 3.B. 
There is so much misuse claims state Senator Nancy Jacobs, wrong people are getting handicapped tags and 
they are taking parking spaces from the people who need them. 
42. Francine Russo, Driving us Crazy, TIME, Aug. 8, 2005 (Only lllinois and New Hampshire 
required mandatory age-based road tests for citizens ages seventy-five years old and older). 
43. In Maryland, the number of disabled drivers with disabled parking license plates was 89,000 as 
of December 2004. After January 1,2006, the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration estimates there will 
be 60,000 vehicles displaying disabled parking license plates. The reduction is due in large part to the 
restrictions placed on transporters of disabled individuals who themselves were not disabled. TASK FORCE, 
supra note 40, at 7. -
44. Stone, 2005-2006 Disability Parking Survey, supra note 7. The empirical study included a five-
page survey conducted at fifty public accommodations. A blank survey is provided infra at Appendix A. 
45. Regulations implementing Title ill of the ADA, 
public accommodation means a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect 
commerce and fall within at least one of the following categories-( I) An inn, hotel, motel, 
or other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building that contains 
not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of 
the establishment as the residence of the proprietor; (2) A restaurant, bar, or other 
establishment serving food or drink; (3) A motion picture house, theater, concert hall, 
stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment; (4) An auditorium, convention center, 
lecture hall, or other place of public gathering; (5) A bakery, grocery store, clothing store, 
hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment; (6) A laundromat, 
dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral 
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issues related to parking accommodations to disabled drivers. Significant 
challenges continue to exist for the disabled driver seeking accessible parking 
spaces. Lack of car and van accessible parking spaces, deficiencies in signage 
to identify accessible parking, and lack of maximum fine postings are a few of 
the findings of the survey.47 
The empirical data provided in this article is submitted to highlight the 
extent of reasonable accommodations provided or denied to disabled drivers. 
All twelve categories of public accommodation were surveyed between 
October 2005 and April 2006. 
The ADA Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG"t8 provide the 
requirements for the number of accessible parking spaces in parking lots of 
places of public accommodations. As the ADA's findings focus on assuring 
"equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living and economic 
self-sufficiency" for disabled persons,49 the ability to drive and park one's 
vehicle to a public accommodation is of utmost importance. The ADA's 
purpose to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities is 
without teeth when access to a public accommodation can not be provided for 
the disabled driver. The surve~o revealed that at twenty-six percent of the 
public accommodations, sufficient accessible parking spaces were not 
provided. 
parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, 
professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment; (7) A 
terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation; (8) A museum, 
library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection; (9) A park, zoo, amusement 
park, or other place of recreation; (10) A nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or 
postgraduate private school, or other place of education; (II) A day care center, senior 
citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center 
establishment; and (12) A gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place 
of exercise or recreation. 
28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007). 
46. Stone, 2005-2006 Disability Parking Survey, supra note 7. The surveys were conducted in 
various counties and cities in Maryland, including counties of Anne Arundel, Baltimore, Charles, Harford, 
Howard, Montgomery, Prince George's, St. Mary's and the City of Baltimore. 
47. [d. 
48. U.S. ARCHITECTURAL & TRANsp. BARRIERS COMPUANCE Bo., AMERICAN WITH DIASABILITlES 
ACT (ADA) ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES (2002), http://www.access-
board.gov/adaaglADAAG.pdf [hereinafter ADAAG. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2007). 
50. See Stone, 2005-2006 Disability Parking Survey, supra note 7. 
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The survey also revealed several deficiencies in parking lots at the public 
accommodations. The three most significant defects were the lack of access 
aisle designation and the deficiencies in sign designation and accessible routeSl 
necessary for a wheelchair user to exit their vehicle and safely transverse into 
the entrance of the public accommodation. Sixty-nine percent were deficient 
in the access aisle, thirty-eight percent were deficient in signage designation 
and thirty percent lacked proper access routes. The deficiencies in access aisle 
and accessible route were particularly troubling, as a disabled driver may find 
an accessible parking space but find it too narrow to accommodate a wheel-
chair user to travel from one's parked car into the public accommodation to 
receive the goods or services necessary for their visit in the first place. 
51. ADAAG, supra note 48, at 4.6.3 (Requirement of 8 feet wide parking space and 5 foot access 
aisle). 
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Often a disabled person drives a van in order to accommodate a 
wheelchair. According to the ADAAG, van parking spaces are required to be 
larger than a car parking space. 52 A van parking space is required to be eight 
feet wide, with a minimum of eight feet wide access aisles,53 and ninety-eight 
inches of vertical clearance available for lift-equipped vans.54 The survey 
revealed that in thirty-two percent of the parking lots at the public 
accommodations, there was not one parking space that was van accessible.55 
The number of van accessible parking spaces under federal law is one in every 
eight spaces;56 however, Maryland is more restrictive, mandating one in every 
four accessible spaces shall be van accessible. 57 The thirty-two percent 
deficiency rate for van access is a significant impediment to many disabled 
drivers. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 4.6.5. 
55. Stone, 2005-2006 Disability Parking Survey, supra note 7, question 6. 
56. ADAAG, supra note 48, at4.1.2(5)(b). At least one of every eight accessible spaces must be van 
accessible, with a minimum of one van accessible spaces in all cases. Id. 
57. MD. CODE REGS. § 05.02.02.07(B)(3)(a). 
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Is the .. at least one parking space that Is van accessible? 
Question 6 
N/A.4% 
In order for the disabled driver to locate the accessible parking spaces in 
the public accommodation's parking lot, it is necessary for proper signage to 
identify the designated space. Both for the non-disabled driver to respect and 
avoid parking in the disabled parking space and to permit easy access and 
parking for the disabled driver, signage is of the utmost importance. 
Unfortunately, the survey found that in twenty percent of the lots, no van 
signage was present.58 The lack of signage for vans creates uncertainty and 
confusion for both the disabled and non-disabled driver. 
58. Stone, 2005-2006 Disability Parking Survey, supra note 7, question 19, at 55. 
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Another fact the survey revealed was the lack of signage announcing the 
maximum fine for illegally parking in accessible spaces. Because a financial 
penalty is one of the ways to prevent non-disabled drivers from parking their 
vehicles in spaces allotted for disabled drivers, posting the financial penalty 
is a necessary element of accessible parking. In forty-three percent of the 
parking lots surveyed, 59 no fine was posted. Interestingly, in the lots that did 
post the maximum fine for illegal parking, the fine ranged from a low of 
$50.00 to a high of $500.00.60 The higher the fine, the greater disincentive to 
occupy a designated space unlawfully. 
59. [d., at 55. The requirement for a statement of the maximum fine is to take effect on October 1, 
2010. 
60. [d. 
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From time to time, non-disabled drivers park their vehicles in disabled 
parking spaces. The reasons for taking the space of a disabled driver vary, but 
include insensitivity, lack of knowledge, weather related reasons, a brief stop, 
plenty of spaces available, parking late at night, and simply by mistake. 
Whatever the reason, the non-disabled driver must become more aware of the 
needs of the disabled driver, particularly the need to park in an accessible 
parking space. Fortunately, while conducting the survey, only seven percent 
of vehicles were illegally parked in accessible parking spaces.61 
61. [d. question 21, at 55. 
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Question 21 
Unlawfully Parked Vehlcle8 
7% 
Lawfully Parked Vehiclea 
93% 
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The difficulty of police enforcement of illegal parking in accessible 
parking spaces often stems from the occurrences of the violation lasting but a 
few minutes. There is not enough time for the police to be called, dispatched, 
and present at the time of the parking infraction. It is no surprise that an 
option for the disgruntled disabled driver is to resort to private action, taking 
the air out of the tire of the parking space bandit. 
IV. STATE MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS-A FIVE STATE COMPARISON 
In 2000, the U.S. Census Bureau reported 49.7 million people with a 
disability or long lasting condition.62 These figures represented 19.3% of the 
civilian non-institutionalized population who were age five or older.63 The 
62. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs!C2kbr-17.pdf. 
63. /d. The census data reveals that for the population sixty-five and over, 41.9% are persons with 
a disability. [d. 
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2000 Census found 9.3 million Americans with a sensory disability involving 
sight or hearing, 21.2 million with a condition limiting physical activities such 
as walking, and 18.2 million ages sixteen and older with difficulty going 
outside of the house.64 
State motor vehicle laws were reviewed and analyzed for comparison in 
five states, Maryland, Florida, California, Texas, and lllinois, with a total 
population of 80,538,137 ages five or older. Issues ranged from who is 
eligible for transportation related accommodations, who certifies the disability, 
the length of validation to acquire parking accommodations, the use of 
placards and disability license plates, and requirements related to accessible 
parking spaces for disabled drivers. In addition, these five state laws were 
compared in the areas of signage and law enforcement for violations of 
accessible parking spaces. Recommendations will be offered in various areas 
of disabled parking. 
The eligibility criteria for persons with disabilities to receive parking 
accommodations are similar among the five states. Mobility of the person 
with a disability is crucial; Maryland requires that the person cannot walk 200 
feet without stopping to rest.65 Another common condition providing for 
eligibility involves lung disease. Florida requires that the "person's forced 
(respiratory) expiratory volume for 1 second, when measured by spirometry, 
is less than 1 liter, or the person's arterial oxygen is less than 60mmlhg on 
room air at rest.,,66 Cardiovascular disease is commonly found in the 
enumerated covered disabilities, provided it is classified in severity as Class 
III or IV according to the American Heart Association Standards.67 The other 
common description involves vision impairment, which is a central visual 
acuity of 20/200 or greater with corrective lenses.68 
64. ld. The census data reports that males with a disability is 19.6%, females with a disability at a 
rate of 19.1 %. African Americans with a disability, five and older, comprise 24.3% of the disabled 
population. ld. 
65. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616(b)(l)(iii) (2006). Other states with the 200 feet delineation 
are Texas and lllinois. TEx. TRANsp. CODE § 681.001(5)(A) (2006); ILL. VEH. CODE § 625 n..cS 511-
159.1(6) (2006). 
66. FLA. STAT. § 320.0848(l)(b)(l)(c) (2006). Maryland, California, Texas and lllinois have similar 
descriptions. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616(b)(l)(i); CAL. VEH. CODE § 295.5(c)(2) (2006); TEx. 
TRANsp. CODE § 681.001(5)(0); ILL. VEH. CODE § 625 ILCS 5/1-159.1(2). 
67. All five states have the American Heart Association Standards. FLA. STAT. § 
320.0848(l)(b)(l)(e); MD. TRANSPORTATION CODE ANN. § 13-616(b)(l)(ii); CAL. VEH. CODE § 295.5(d); 
TEx. TRANsp. CODE § 68I.ooI(5)(F); ILL. VEH. CODE § 625 ILCS 511-159.1(4). 
68. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616(b)(l)(viii)(l); CAL. VEH. CODE § 295.5(b). 
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In all five states, a licensed physician certifies that a person is entitled to 
a disability designation.69 The length of validation of a physician's 
certification often ranges from six months for a temporary disability to no 
limitation for permanent disabilities.70 There appears to be no reason for a 
driver with a permanent disability as recognized by a licensed physician to 
seek annual recertification, which is costly and time consuming for the 
disabled driver. 
The types of placards displayed in vehicles of disabled drivers and 
passengers are either temporary or permanene l and must hang on the rearview 
mirror of the vehicle used to transport the disabled person.72 Often, disability 
labeled license plates are provided to the disabled driver or owner of the 
vehicle. An applicant for the disability plates must be a resident of the state 
and have a permanent disability certified by a physician. 73 
The parking space designated for the disabled driver is precisely 
described by the ADAAG.74 For cars, the standard accessible space is eight 
feet wide with a five foot access aisle75 and for a van accessible space, the size 
is eight feet wide with an eight foot access aisle.76 The state motor vehicle and 
transportation laws also cover parking space size requirements, modeled after 
the ADAAG. For example, the width requirements of Maryland and Texas77 
are identical to the ADAAG, while California provides a nine feet wide with 
a five foot aisle for cars and nine feet wide and an eight foot aisle.78 At 
present, van accessible space requirements vary from either one in every eight 
69. FLA. STAT. § 320.0848(1)(b)(2); MD. TRANSPORTATION CODE ANN. § 13-616(b)(1); CAL. VEH. 
CODE § 295.5(a); TEx. TRANsp. CODE § 681.001(5)(1); ILL. VEH. CODE § 625 ILCS 5!1-159.1. Also 
included physician assistant or advanced practice nurse. [d. 
70. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.0848(1)(d), (3)(b). Certification automatically renews for permanent 
disabilities. [d. 
71. The Texas Transportation Code provides for temporary and permanent, delineations blue for 
mobility impaired, red for non-mobility impaired. TEx. TRANsp. CODE § 681.002(b)(l). Temporary 
placards are often limited to six months in duration. Permanent placards often require re-issue every four 
years. An additional requirement for permanent placards should include turning in the placard within 30 
days after death of disabled person, thus limiting fraudulent use. 
72. Placard must be visible from front of vehicle. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.0848(2)(a). 
73. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616.I(a). In illinois, disability plates are issued to a qualified 
disabled driver or parent or legal guardian who depends on the parent or legal guardian frequently for 
transportation. ILL. VEH. CODE § 625 ILCS 5!3-616(b). 
74. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (covering architectural accessibility and barrier removal). 
75. UNITED STATES ACCESS BOARD, TECHNICAL BULLETIN: P ARKlNG, Fig. 9 Dimensions of Parking 
Spaces, http://www.access-board.gov!Adaaglaboutlbulletins!parking.htrn. 
76. [d. 
77. MD. CODE REGS. § 05.02.02.07(B)(3)(a); TExAs ACCESSIBILITY STANDARDS § 4.6.2. 
78. CAL. BUILDING CODE § 1129B.4.1 (2001). 
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accessible spaces 79 to one in every four spaces;80 however, Florida provides no 
distinction between standard and van space requirements.81 It is recommended 
that all accessible parking spaces be eight feet wide with an eight foot access 
aisle, allowing both cars and vans access to the space. 
Another common issue the state motor vehicle laws address is the waiver 
of the meter fee for a disabled driver. While parking meters are often limited 
in time to two hours, a disabled driver in Maryland and Florida can park one's 
car at a meter without paying the fee for twice the time limit, not exceeding 
four hours.82 California and Texas impose no fee or maximum time limit for 
a disabled person to park at a parking meter.83 Nonetheless, state laws prohibit 
disabled drivers from parking in no parking zones.84 
Signage designating accessible parking is of utmost importance. The 
ADAAG require a sign with the international symbol of access mounted high 
enough to be seen when a vehicle is parking in the space.85 Maryland requires 
signs to be located in front of the space, flushed against a building or between 
six to ten feet high.86 Florida and California require each' accessible space to 
be prominently outlined in blue paint. 87 All accessible spaces should be 
designated by paint on the parking space and vertical signs high enough to be 
seen by drivers. In addition, to deter non-disabled drivers from occupying 
disabled spaces illegally, the signage should include the fine for illegal parking 
and the international symbol of accessibility. 
In order to enforce accessible parking laws, police must have the 
authority to write citations for violations. Parking enforcement specialists, as 
are provided in Florida and California, can assist local police in writing 
citations. 88 The maximum penalties for such violations vary among states. 
Illinois limits the fine to $250.00,89 while Florida, California, and Texas 
79. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 24. 
80. See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. § 05.02.02.07 (2007), available at 
hnp://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/05/05.02.02.07.htm (the code of Maryland Regulations or "COMAR" 
are regulations which are authorized by the Maryland legislature to implement the state statutes). 
81. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 553.5041 (West 2007). 
82. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616(f)(2)(ii)(I). 
83. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22511.5(a)(2); TEx. TRANsp. CODE § 68I.oo6(b). 
84. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616(f)(3) (also restricting parking during heavy traffic rush hour 
periods or where parking would cause a traffic hazard). 
85. STATES ACCESS BOARD, ADA ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES FOR BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES § 
4.6.4, hnp://www.access-board.gov/adaaglhtmVadaag.htm .. 
86. See, e.g., MD CODE REGS. § 05.02.02.07 (2007), available at 
hnp://www.dsd.state.md.us/comar/05/05.02.02.07.htm. 
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 553.5041(6) (West 2007); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22511.7. 
88. Id. 
89. See 625 ILCS 5/11-208.3 (West 2007). 
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impose maximum fines of $1000.00.90 The higher the fine, the greater 
likelihood sufficient spaces will remain for the disabled driver. 
With the significant number of disabled drivers searching for accessible 
parking spaces, the police must have the authority to ticket violators. Disabled 
drivers seeking accessible parking at shopping areas, places of employment, 
and at home are significant. In Maryland, there are 370,001 permanent 
placards issued,91 and there are 82,502 active motor vehicle registrations 
(plates).92 Accordingly, police should be permitted to regulate parking, 
impound vehicles parked in violation of disability designation, tow vehicles 
from publicly and privately owned parking lots, and issue citations for 
violations. The challenge for police enforcement often involves the ability of 
law enforcement officers to enter private parking lots used by the public. 
Many places of public accommodations, 93 including places of lodging, 
shopping centers, and health care providers are particular locations that require 
close and careful police monitoring to limit non-disabled drivers occupying 
parking spaces reserved for the individual with a disability. 
V. POLICE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE PARKING 
In Maryland, police officers and other individuals so authorized are 
permitted to regulate parking on both public and privately owned parking 
10ts.94 The authority to regulate access to parking for the disabled driver 
encompasses the parking lots for places of public accommodations. Maryland 
law also encourages the education of officers, businesses, and the public at 
large regarding parking regulations, the authorization of law enforcement 
officers to enter and issue citations for violations of a parking ordinance in 
privately owned parking lots, and eligibility prerequisites for registration plates 
and placards for disabled drivers.95 Parking, standing, or stopping in a zone 
designated for disabled individuals, except for the use of a disabled individual, 
is included in violations for which an officer may issue a citation.96 The ability 
of the police to monitor and enforce parking regulations is essential in order 
for the disabled driver to access places of public accommodations. 
90. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.0848(5); CAL. VEH. CODE § 4461(b); TEx. TRANsp. CODE § 681.0101(j)(1). 
91. Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration response to Freedom of Information request, April 6, 
2006, Sandra L. Dalton, Operations Research (on file with author). 
92. Id. 
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. 
94. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §§ 26-301 (b)(3), (e)(l). 
95. Id. at § 26-301(e). 
96. Id. at § 21-IOO3(u). 
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A licensed physician, optometrist, or podiatrist must verify that an applicant 
for a disability registration number and registration plates or placards meets 
the requirements provided in Maryland law.97 Physical impairments 
warranting disability registration and plates or placards include lung disease, 
cardiovascular disease, inability to walk 200 feet without resting, inability to 
walk without the use of an assistive apparatus, use of a wheelchair, loss of a 
limb, visual impairments, as well as other conditions that impair the 
ambulatory function of the applicant.98 Maryland law permits disabled drivers 
to park at a parking meter without paying the required fee for twice the 
maximum time allowed by the meter, not exceeding four hours.99 If the meter 
allows parking for greater than four hours, the disabled driver may park there 
for the time permitted by the meter. 1OO However, Maryland law prohibits 
disabled drivers from ever parking in no-parking zones, zones designated for 
specific vehicles, or where local ordinances otherwise restrict parking. 101 
Upon request of a police officer or other person so authorized, a driver must 
present identification as proof that the parking privileges are being used by a 
disabled individual. 102 Violations of Maryland law regarding parking for 
disabled drivers, including fraud and misrepresentation, are misdemeanors. 103 
All the parking provisions for an individual with a disability are designed to 
provide meaningful access to places of public accommodations. The ADA 
opens the door to the disabled and provides space in which to park ones 
vehicle in a safe and accessible location. 
VI. MARYLAND'S TASK FORCE ON PARKING FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES 104 
The Maryland General Assembly recognized the challenges and obstacles 
facing drivers with disabilities and established the Task Force on Parking for 
Individuals with Disabilities. 105 The Legislature directed the Task Force to 
study current laws on parking privileges for persons with disabilities and to 
make recommendations for regulations related to the use of disabled parking 
97. [d. at § 13-616(b)(l). 
98. [d. 
99. MD. CODE ANN .• TRANsp. §13-616(f)(2)(ii)(1.). 
100. [d. at § 13-616(f)(2)(ii)(2.). 
101. [d. at § 13-616(f)(3). 
102. [d. at §§ 13-616(g). 
103. [d. at §§ 13-616(k), 27-101(a). 
104. S. 368,2004 Leg., 418th Sess. (Md. 2004). 
105. See id. 
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placards and license plates. 106 The Task Force, comprised of citizen members, 
heard from experts who testified on engineering and accessibility codes, as 
well as on medical and enforcement issues. 107 The Task Force ultimately made 
recommendations to enhance and improve disabled parking accessibility 
issues. As a result of the proceedings, the Task Force made five 
recommendations that tighten the eligibility requirements for individuals 
applying for disabled parking privileges, two that strengthen the enforcement 
of the disabled parking privilege, and one dealing with disabled parking 
accessibility issues.108 The Task Force also encouraged the enhancement of 
public awareness and education to make Marylanders more aware of disability 
parking laws. 109 
The Task Force recognized the challenges of enforcing the disabled 
parking privilege. "Three layers of requirements, federal, state and local, 
complicate the enforcement of the disabled parking laws."lIo The Task Force 
also heard the challenges in determining whether the driver of the vehicle was 
entitled to disability parking privileges. II I Additionally, law enforcement was 
in need of guidance regarding the issuance of citations for parking violations 
on private property.1I2 The Task Force addressed various issues in need of 
clarification, such as the procedure for the non-disabled driver who transports 
a disabled person. 113 Because federal and state definitions vary, the description 
of who is entitled to the disabled parking privilege requires clarification. 114 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
A. First Recommendation 
The "current eligibility criteria for disabled parking privileges are too 
broad." 115 "The Task Force recommend[ed] that eligibility for permanent 
106. Jd., at page 3. 
107. Jd., at page I. The Task Force was also comprised of legislators, representatives of states 
agencies, private associations. Jd. 
108. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 3. 
109. Jd. at 7. 
110. Jd. In addition, counties and municipalities have enacted local ordinances, accounting for the 
variety of fines and enforcement activities around the state. Jd. 
Ill. Jd. 
112. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 7. 
113. Jd. ''The MV A estimates that roughly 30,000 of approximately 89,000 disabled parking plates 
currently on Maryland vehicles are issued to transporters." Jd. 
114. Jd. Maryland's regulations, which allow certain physical ailments such as blindness, are broader 
and more inclusive than federal regulations, which require a person's mobility or conditions affecting 
ambulatory ability to be the determinative factors . .Id. 
115. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 8. 
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disability placards and plates under the 'hardship/risk of injury' provisions ... 
be restricted to those applicants whose permanent disability adversely impacts 
the applicant's ambulatory ability."116 
In response to this recommendation on eligibility criteria, the Maryland 
Legislature required that the permanent disability of an applicant for special 
disability registration plates must "adversely impact[] the ambulatory ability 
of the applicant and [be] so severe that the person would endure a hardship or 
be subject to a risk of injury if the privileges accorded a person for whom a 
vehicle is specially registered ... were denied."117 
B. Second Recommendation 
"The Task Force recommend[ed] that the total number of permanent 
disability placards and plates an individual can receive be limited to: (i) one 
set of plates and one (1) placard or (ii) two placards if the individual does not 
request a disability plate.,,118 
The Maryland General Assembly followed these recommendations, 
limiting the issuance of one placard and one set of special registration plates 
or two placards and no special registration plates. 119 This is a reasonable 
restriction because "Maryland law requires that the disabled parking placard 
be used only if the qualified placard holder is in the vehicle .... "120 This 
restriction will cut down on abuse by the non-disabled driver who uses a 
vehicle with disabled designation that is not occupied by the disabled 
person. 121 
C. Third Recommendation 
"The Task Force recommend[ed] that disabled parking plates ... be 
limited to disabled applicants who are either owners or co-owners of the 
vehicle.',122 The Maryland General Assembly acknowledged "that of the 
approximately 89,000 currently issued disabled parking plates, an estimated 
116. Id. 
117. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 13-616(b)(l)(ix) (West 2006). 
118. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 9. The Task Force was concerned that "the additional placards 
presented a significant potential for abuse." [d. The MVA found "there [were] currently outstanding 
approximately 336,000 disabled parking placards for approximately 250,000 disabled parking privilege 
holders." Id. 
119. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §13-616(c)(l)(i)(ii). 
120. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 9. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 10. 
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30,000 of [those] plates are issued to non-disabled transporters.,,123 To better 
regulate the distribution of disabled parking plates and reduce abuse, the 
Maryland Legislature mandated that only the owner of a vehicle may apply for 
special disability registration plates. 124 
D. Fourth Recommendation 
"The Task Force recommend [ ed] that the General Assembly clarify that 
an applicant for a disabled parking placard or license plates must be a 
Maryland resident.,,125 Following the Task Force recommendation, the 
Maryland law restricted persons applying for a parking placard to residents of 
Maryland. 126 This residency requirement for the issuance of parking placards 
and disabled parking license plates prevents "'forum shopping' by out-of-state 
applicants who may not be eligible for placards under the standards of their 
home jurisdiction .... "127 
E. Fifth Recommendation 
"The Task Force recommend[ed] that Maryland's current requirement 
that a physician recertify an individual with permanent disabilities every four 
years be eliminated .... "128 For those persons with permanent disabilities, the 
burdensome requirement of obtaining physician recertification was seen as 
unnecessary. The Maryland General Assembly incorporated this 
recommendation by permitting a renewal of the placard every four years with 
simply an application form approved by the Motor Vehicle Administration. 129 
This eliminated the physician recertification, saving permanently disabled 
individuals expenses and time. 
123. [d. U[O]rganizations such as nursing homes that transport the disabled [may] have facilities 
plates that provide disabled parking privileges." [d. 
124. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §13-616(b)(l) (West 2006). 
125. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 10. Federal regulatory scheme anticipates each state to issue 
disabled parking plates and placards to state residents only and require each state to recognize plates and 
placards issued by other states. [d. 
126. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §13-616.I(a)(l) (West 2006). 
127 . TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at II. 
128. [d. U[O]nce certified as permanently disabled, [individuals] would no longer be required to 
obtain a physician's recertification." [d. 
129. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §13-616.I(d) (West 2006). 
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F. Sixth Recommendation 
"[E]nact[ing] and implement[ing] . . . expanded disabled parking 
enforcement efforts through alternative means such as the use of authorized 
auxiliary personnel, private security and volunteer groups.,,130 Maryland law 
encourages local jurisdictions to provide alternative enforcement initiatives for 
disabled parking infractions. 131 
G. Seventh Recommendation 
The Task Force "[E]ncourag[ed] and support[ed] public outreach efforts 
to educate law enforcement, businesses, medical practitioners and the general 
public as to the State law requirements for disabled parking ... ."132 The public 
awareness campaign is necessary to educate the community on enforcement, 
eligibility criteria for disabled parking plates and placards, and "[t]he 
requirement that the disabled person must be in the vehicle either as a driver 
or passenger in order for the vehicle to be entitled to park in a disabled parking 
spot. .. ."\33 Maryland law's public outreach provisions announce the 
importance of the education of the non-disabled as well as the disabled 
drivers. 134 
The Task Force on Parking for Individuals with Disabilities was highly 
successful in opening a dialogue among community interest groups, 
identifying specific challenges facing the disabled driver, and educating the 
community at large. The Task Force's announcement of the importance of 
regUlating and enforcing disabled parking laws in a fair and equitable way was 
clearly accomplished by the Task Force. The swift and appropriate actions of 
the Maryland General Assembly in enacting the Task Force recommendations 
are a testament to the success of the Task Force on Parking for Individuals 
with Disabilities. Other states that address the needs of disabled drivers should 
follow the course taken by Maryland. 
130. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 14. The concern of enforcement is seen especially in smaller 
local jurisdictions with more budgetary constraints. Jd .. 
131. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §26-301(a) (West 2006) (permits any political subdivision to issue 
citations by authorized individuals). 
132. TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 15. 
133. Jd. Additionally, the disabled person is required to possess an MVA-issued certification card. 
134. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. §26-301(e) (West 2006). Efforts include educating the public about 
parking laws, including ''the authority of law enforcement officers to enter private parking lots used by the 
public," and the eligibility criteria for requirements for individuals with disabilities using special plates and 
placards. Jd. 
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In several states, an additional fee was imposed on disabled drivers who 
receive removable windshield placards needed to access parking spaces 
reserved for disabled individuals. In Duprey v. Connecticut, an individual with 
a limitation in the major life activity of walking challenged an additional $5.00 
application surcharge for placards. 135 The court rejected the Connecticut 
surcharge fee, asserting a violation of the ADA's prohibition on discriminatory 
surcharges. 136 
The court in Thrope v. Ohio reached a similar result, holding that a $5.00 
fee for a placard violated the ADA. 137 According to the court, public entities 
may not pass on the costs of compliance within the ADA to disabled 
individuals "as a condition for the enjoyment of ADA-mandated measures.,,138 
Reserved parking for disabled persons, free of surcharges, was the court's 
acknowledgement of a much bigger issue: "flexibility and control over one's 
life that allows for economic and personal self-sufficiency," as well as a 
"greater level of participation in public life.,,139 
vm. PHYSICIAN DUTY TO NOTIFY MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION AND 
PATIENT 
When a person with a disability considers driving a motor vehicle, the 
issue of safety is foremost in one's mind. The importance of self-sufficiency 
for the disabled individual is significantly compromised when a physician 
advises against driving due to safety concerns. The legal consequences of 
failing to warn a driver of potential risks due to a medical condition can be 
monumental. The risk to both the disabled driver and the community at large 
are to be pondered when a physician is faced with the issue of whether to 
advise a patient with a disability to cease driving. 
Advising a disabled person not to drive has adverse implications for 
employment, leisure activity, and overall interaction within the community. 
A physician is often forced to decide whether to advise a patient against 
135. Duprey v. Connecticut, 28 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding $5.00 application fee for 
placards was a surcharge because it exceeded the amount generally paid by all those using parking spaces). 
136. Id. at 710 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (1996». 
137. Thrope v. Ohio, 19 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding ADA prohibits state from 
charging disabled persons to pay a user fee to cover costs of ADA-mandated accommodations). 
138. Id. at 825. See also Dare v. California, No. CV96 - 5569 JSL, 1997 U.S. Dist.lLxIS 23158, at 
*2, (C.D. Cal. May 30, 1997) (holding $6.00 fee for placards that pennit the use of parking spaces reserved 
for persons with disabilities violates the ADA). 
139. Dare, 1997 U.S. Dist.lLxIS 23158, at *10. See generally Brown v. North Carolina Dept. Motor 
Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999) (11th Amendment issues presented in placard surcharge cases); see 
also Neinast v. Texas, 217 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2(00). 
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dri ving and whether to notify the Department of Motor Vehicles that a current 
driver's privilege should be revoked. This additional step of notifying the 
motor vehicle administration often puts the physician in a no-win situation. 
A physician with the legal duty to report a patient's medical condition to 
a government agency creates an atmosphere where truth and confidence are 
chilled. The physician treating a person with a disability aims to improve the 
health of the patient. An important factor in this relationship is the level of 
trust and confidence the patient places in the physician. The duty of 
confidence is at risk when a patient fears his privacy and trust may be 
compromised by the physician. This severely tests physicians treating 
disabled patients by forcing them to weigh the privacy concerns of his or her 
patient against the safety concerns of the community at large. 
In Medina v. Pillemer, the court confronted the issue of a physician's duty 
to warn both the patient and third parties after a driver with a malignant tumor 
and a history of seizures caused an automobile accident, severely injuring a 
third party.l40 The court recognized the risks of severe injury or death in a 
motor vehicle accident to the driving public as well as to the disabled driver 
if the disabled driver were to suffer a seizure while driving. 141 The neurologist 
treating the disabled driver "was in the best position," according to the court, 
"to have known of the potentially dangerous condition and to have taken 
reasonable steps to avert that risk.,,'42 
The importance of advising the patient of the risks of driving and 
instructing him or her not to drive were the thrust of the opinion. Unlike the 
duty to warn third parties when a psychiatrist is treating a mentally ill patient 
with homicidal tendencies, the duty here was more limited in advising the 
patient with seizures and a brain tumor to stop driving. 143 The court placed the 
responsibility of notifying the Registry of Motor Vehicles on the person unfit 
to drive, not the physician. The court acknowledged that common law does 
not require the physician to report a driver with seizures to the Registry of 
Motor Vehicles. '44 Such a requirement may jeopardize the doctor-patient 
relationship, "discourag[ing] patients from disclosing sensitive medical 
information to their doctors .... "145 While the physician has a duty to warn the 
140. Medina v. Pillemer, No. 04-0290-H, 2005 WL 3627226 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 2005). 
141. Id at *7. 
142. [d. at *8. 
143. [d.; see also Duvall v. Goldin, 362 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (court looked at policy 
considerations and forseeability when determining if there was a duty to warn patient not to drive, leaving 
questions of fact to the jury). 
144. Medina, 2005 WL 3627226, at *9. 
145. [d., at *9. 
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disabled patient not to drive, that duty is not extended to third parties. 146 The 
balance of safety to the patient and third parties and the respect for the 
physician-patient relationship led the court to require physicians to advise 
patients with seizures not to drive. 147 
The duty to warn patients of known dangers associated with taking a 
prescription medication was extended to the pubic in Robinson v. Health 
Midwest Development Group.148 The patient was administered prescription 
drugs that were known to cause drowsiness and dizziness. 149 The court's 
analysis of the duty to warn patients and extending such a duty to the general 
public were centered on public policy factors as found in the case of Millard 
v. Corrado. 150 The court clearly articulated the factors to consider in 
determining whether public policy favors extending the duty of a physician to 
warn a patient of the risks associated with prescription drugs and driving a 
motor vehicle to the general public. 151 The Millard court, relying on the 
Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America 
Dairymen, Inc., announced the following factors for consideration: 
(1) the social consensus that the interest is worth protecting, (2) the 
foreseeability of harm and the degree of certainty that the protected 
person suffered the injury, (3) the moral blame society attaches to the 
conduct, (4) the prevention of future harm, (5) the consideration of 
cost and ability to spread the risk of loss, and (6) the economic burden 
upon the actor and the community.152 
146. [d. 
147. [d. at *14. 
148. Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group, No. WD 58290, 2001 Mo. App. LExIs 353 
(W.D. Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2001) (reversed by Missouri Supreme Court on other grounds, 58 S.W.3d 519 
(Mo. 2001). It is important to note that the procedural posture behind this case is that the Court of Appeals 
was hearing the case on appeal from a grant of summary judgment. The Court of Appeals did not actually 
hold that there was a duty, only that a trier of fact could find that such a duty existed. The Court of Appeals 
was later reversed by the Supreme Court of Missouri for the reason that the statute of limitations for medical 
negligence applied to the case, rather than for actions brought for general negligence. The statute of 
limitations for medical negligence was two years, as opposed to the five year statute of limitations for 
actions brought under general negligence. The Supreme Court of Missouri never reached the merits of the 
case. Robinson v. Health Midwest Development Group, 58 S.W. 3d 519 (Mo. 2001). 
149. Robinson, 2001 Mo. App. LExIs 353, at *1. The patient-driver "crossed the center line of the 
roadway, and collided head on with appellant's vehicle, causing her injury." [d. 
ISO. Millard v. Corrado, 14 S.W.3d 42 (Ct. App. 2000). 
151. [d. at 47. 
152. [d. (citing Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 432 (Mo. 
1985) (en banc». 
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In weighing the above factors, the court in Robinson found there could be a 
duty to the general public by a physician to warn a patient as to the known 
dangers associated with taking a prescribed drug. 153 
In Trott v. Patterson, the court heard a claim in which a patient blacked 
out behind the wheel and killed an individual. l54 The physician treating a 
patient with a head injury told him he could drive despite unpredictable 
reactions to medications administered for pain. 155 The physician was found to 
be in violation of a state statute, since revised, which mandated a physician 
report to the state health department "the name, age and address of each person 
known to him to be subject to recurrent attacks of epilepsy ... or ... recurrent 
periods of unconsciousness uncontrolled by medical treatment." 156 A violation 
of this statutory duty to report "may [have] giver n] a third-party member of the 
driving public a cause of action against [the] physician who fail[ed] to use 
reasonable care to protect the driving public .... "157 Such a violation was 
viewed as negligence per se. 158 
One of the earlier decisions placing a duty to the driving public on 
physicians is Gooden v. Tips.159 The physician treated a patient for depression 
and drug abuse and prescribed medication. However, the physician "fail[ed] 
to warn [the patient] not to drive an automobile while under the influence of 
[the] drugs .... ,,160 The court ruled that "a physician can owe a duty to use 
reasonable care to protect the driving public where the physician's negligence 
in diagnosis or treatment of his patient .contributes to plaintiff's injuries.,,161 
The Gooden court acknowledged that physician may have a duty to warn the 
patient not to drive, but not the more significant duty to prevent the patient 
from driving. 162 
153. Robinson, 2001 Mo. App.lExIs 353, at *40-41. 
154. 52 Trott v. Patterson, No. 64373, 1993 Conn. Super.l..EXIs 388, at *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 
9, 1993). 
155. /d. at *2. 
156. [d. at *3-4 (stating that reporting was kept confidential) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-46 
(1979». In July of 1990, the statute was amended to make the physician's duty to report pennissive instead 
of mandatory by replacing the words "shall report" with "may report." 1990 Conn. Legis. Servo P.A. 90-265 
(West). 
157. Trott, 1993 Conn. Super. lExIs 388, at *5. 
158. [d. . 
159. Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). 
160. [d. at 365. 
161. [d. at 369. 
162. [d. at 370 (no duty on physician "to control the conduct of [the] patient"); See also Wilschinsky 
v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713, 717 (N.M. 1989) (physician had a duty to the driving public when he administered 
drugs to his patient with side-effects "known to affect judgment and driving ability"); Myers v. Quesenberry, 
144 Cal. App. 3d 888,893 (1983) ("where warning the [patient] is a reasonable step to take in the exercise 
of the standard of care applicable to physicians, liability is not conditioned on potential victims being readily 
identifiable as well as foreseeable"). 
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In contrast to several courts that do impose a duty to warn on a treating 
physician, the court in Kolbe v. Iowa reached the opposite result. 163 A bicyclist 
who was struck and severely injured by a disabled driver with vision 
impairment brought suit against the driver and treating physician. 164 The court 
focused on the reasonable forseeability of injury in addressing the issue of 
whether a physician had a duty to protect the bicyclist and public at large from 
any danger posed by the driver. 165 The court, in refusing to impose a duty on 
physicians, focused on the importance of physicians being able to fulfill their 
duty to patients. The court reasoned that physicians should be able to treat 
patients without the fear of third party liability claims for acts of patients over 
which physicians have no control. 166 Furthermore, the Kolbe court asserted 
that it is of utmost importance that the physician's first loyalty and duty to his 
or her patient is not compromised. 167 The court was concerned that imposing 
liability on physicians for their patient's driving would create an atmosphere 
in which doctors would be overly restrictive concerning their patient's 
activities and would not act in their patient's best interest. 168 The Kolbe court 
was particularly alarmed by the potential chilling effect on a physician's 
willingness to ever recommend driving when an unlimited potential for 
liability exists. 169 
Even where a state requires a physician to report a patient with epilepsy, 
state courts have refused to impose liability on physicians for failure to report. 
In Harden v. Allstate Insurance Company, a physician failed to report a patient 
with epilepsy to the Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles. 170 The court found 
the state statute requiring physicians to notify the Division of Motor Vehicles 
was designed to enforce the licensing procedure process. 171 However, the 
163. Kolbe v. Iowa, 661 N.W.2d 142 (Ia. 2003). 
164. Id. at 145. 
165. Id. at 150. 
166. Id. at 149. The court unwilling to intrude into the physician and patient relationship. 
167. Id.; see also Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733A.2d 623 (Pa. 1999). There is no duty on a phYSician 
to report a patient with vision impairment to the Department of Transportation. 
168. Kolbe. 661 N.W.2d at 149; see also Praesil v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391 (Tx. 1998). Although 
the state statute permits physicians to inform state of the identity of the patient with epilepsy for possible 
revocation of driver's license, there is no imposition of negligence per se for physician failure to report. 
169. Kolbe. 661 N.W.2d at 149. The imposition of liability would create divided loyalty between the 
welfare of patients to whom they have a primary responsibility, and the welfare of the unknown public; see 
also Werner v. Vanner, Stafford, & Seaman, 659 So. 2d 1308 (Fla. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1995). Under Florida 
law, there is no duty on doctors to warn patients not to drive. 
170. Harden v. Allstate Insurance Co., 883 F. Supp. 963 (D. Del. 1995). Driver crossed center lane 
of street, striking his vehicle into oncoming vehicle, killing driver, his wife and son; see also Hospodar v. 
Schick, No. 971 WDA 2003,885 A.2d 986 (Pa. Super. Nov. 23,2005). There is no duty to report. 
171. Harden. 883 F. Supp. at 969-70. Statute of reporting was enacted not for the safety of others, 
but for enforcing motor vehicle laws. 
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court found no liability per se on the part of the physician for failing to notify 
the DMV.172 
The liability of physicians who fail to warn their patients of the risks of 
driving motor vehicles and the safety concerns of the community at large raise 
the question for state legislators. Several states are undertaking this quest to 
address what responsibility physicians should carry in treating disabled 
persons through legislation. 
IX. THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD 
Drivers with physical or mental impairments are on the road, many driving 
safely, some not. In order to monitor and impose driving restrictions on the 
impaired driver, state licensing agencies have appointed a Medical Advisory 
Board ("MAB"). For example, the Maryland MAB was created to define 
disorders or conditions that could impair an individual's ability to drive, to 
develop reporting requirements and confidentiality protections, and to oversee 
the procedures for the safe operation of a motor vehicle. 173 
A MAB oversees the licensing application procedure for the driver with 
medical or functional impairments. Examples of medical conditions reviewed 
by a MAB that may impact one's ability to drive a motor vehicle safely 
include lapse in consciousness,174 eye disorders, cardiovascular diseases, 
metabolic disorders, neurological disorders, psychiatric disorders, and alcohol 
and drug induced conditions. 175 
Medical conditions that may impact safe driving are discovered in a 
number of ways, including self-disclosure during the initial request for a 
driver's license, police reporting after a motor vehicle accident, physician 
reporting, and any interested party providing information to the MAB. As a 
result, a physician is often required to complete a questionnaire to advise the 
MAB about the safe driving of the patient. States are also requiring a current 
driver to report any medical condition that is likely to cause loss of 
consciousness, blackout, seizure, drug or substance dependence or abuse, 
Parkinson's disease, or dementia. 176 
172. [d. at 971; see also Thompson v. Davis, No. CV287-197, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3268 (S. Dist. 
Ga. Mar. 31, 1988). Florida reporting statute is not mandatory, thus not creating tort duty to 3rd party. 
173. MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 16-119 (2006). 
174. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §103900 (2006). The code includes medical conditions that 
involve marked reduction of alertness or responsiveness to external stimuli, inability to perform activities 
of daily living such as bathing, dressing, feeding oneself and impairment in sensory motor functions. 
175. 37 TEx. ANN. CODE §15.58 (2007). Medical conditions include stroke, convulsive disorders, 
Parkinson's disorder, sleep apnea. 
176. MD. CODE REGS. 11.l7 .03.02-1 (A)(2007). 
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Five state statutes were reviewed to compare and contrast the approach 
take.n in monitoring and regulating the disabled driver. 177 Issues included 
physician reporting requirements, driver duty to report medical conditions, 
confidentiality protections, MAB criteria for review, actions available to the 
MAB, regarding conditions, restrictions, or revocation of licenses and hearing 
rights. Recommendations are provided on several specific issues. 
All five states have in place a MAB with the role of advising the state 
motor vehicle administration on medical criteria and vision standards relating 
to the licensing of drivers, as well as reviewing and consulting on an 
individual's physical and mental qualifications to safely drive.178 
The requirement of an applicant or licensed driver to self-report a medical 
condition to the MAB is addressed in Maryland, Texas, and Dlinois law. 
Maryland requires a licensee or applicant for a driver's license to notify the 
Motor Vehicle Administration of a diagnosis of a variety of medical 
conditions, including epilepsy, stroke, alcohol or drug dependence or abuse, 
manic depression, schizophrenia disorders, lapse of consciousness, vision 
disorder, Parkinson's disease, and dementia.179 The listing of specific 
disorders that require disclosure is wise. However, it is recommended that an 
additional requirement includes disclosure of any mental or physical 
impairment or condition that will affect one's ability to operate a motor vehicle 
safely. This functional approach will allow for a balance between the safety 
concerns of all drivers and the interest in the disabled driver to continue to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
The controversial requirement to mandate physician reporting of a patient 
driver is a complex issue. Many states provide for a voluntary provision for 
physician reporting. Florida's reporting provision allows any physician having 
knowledge of a licensed driver's or applicant's mental or physical disability, 
which could affect driving ability, to report such knowledge to the Department 
of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles:80 California stands alone in the 
mandatory physician reporting law for patients diagnosed with medical 
conditions that are characterized by loss of consciousness. lSI In California, 
177. States include California, Florida, llIinois, Maryland and Texas. 
178. See FLA. ST. ANN. §322 125 (3)(a),(b ),( 4 )(2006); TEx HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12.092 (2006); 
37 Tx ADMIN. CODE § 15.58 (2006); 625 ILCS 516-902 (2007); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22511.58 (2007); MD. 
TRANs. CODE ANN. § 16-118 (2007). 
179. MD. CODE REGS. 11.17.03.02-1. Upon application for the renewal of driver's license, the 
applicant shall answer questions from the Motor Vehicle Administration pertaining to disorders affecting 
ability to drive. 
180. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.126 (2) (2006); see also TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12.092(2006). 
Voluntary provision of physician to report; see also 625 ILL. COMPo STAT. 516-911(2007). illinois' 
physician's voluntary provision if condition interferes with ability to operate motor vehicle. 
181. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1039OO(a)(2006). The code mandates physicians and surgeons 
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disorders characterized by lapses of consciousness include medical conditions 
that involve marked reduction of alertness or responsiveness to external 
stimuli, inability to perform one or more activities of daily living, and 
impairment of sensory motor functions used to operate a motor vehicle. 182 
Although the physician mandatory reporting requirement may prevent 
some disabled drivers from getting behind the wheel, the mandatory reporting 
would undermine the physician-patient relationship. It is recommended that 
the duty to report medical conditions that affect safe driving be a requirement 
of the applicant and licensed driver and not the physician. The motor vehicle 
administration will continue to receive referrals and information of potentially 
unsafe drivers from police, courts, family, friends, other citizens, hospitals, 
occupational therapists, physical therapists, vision specialists, emergency 
medical personnel, and other individuals and agencies. 183 
The reporting requirements addressed in state motor vehicle laws often 
address the issue of confidentiality. Florida provides that reports by physicians 
and agencies regarding a driver's or applicant's disability shall be 
confidential. l84 Furthermore, the individuals who report will be provided 
immunity from civil or criminal action. 185 It is recommended that such reports 
provided by physicians or other interested parties or agencies be confidential 
and not disclosed to the pUblic. The subject of the report should, however, 
have access to the report and it should be allowed into evidence in a judicial 
review proceeding by court order. 186 Also, anonymous reporting should not 
be accepted, which casts doubt on its reliability. 
In several states' MAB reporting procedures, physicians may voluntarily 
report a patient's physical or mental condition that, in the physician's 
judgment, will significantly impair a person's ability to safely operate a motor 
vehicle. 187 Such voluntary reporting leads to the patient so reported to be 
examined or investigated. 
The who, what, when, where, and why of physician reporting by state of 
an impaired person's ability to drive is most revealing. The "who" in reporting 
includes any physician who diagnoses a physical or mental condition that 
to notify the local health officer of all patients at least 14 years of age who has been diagnosed with a 
disorder characterized by lapses of consciousness. 
182. Id § (d). The code includes "Alzheimer's disease ... and related disorders sever enough to be 
likely to impair a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle .... " 
183. American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Summary of Medical Advisory Board 
Practices in the United States, June 18,2003, available at, http://www.mdsupport.orgldrivingsummary.pdf. 
184. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.126(3)(2006). 
185. Id. § (3); see TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12.097 (2006). Confidentiality requirements for 
reporting; see MD. ANN. CODE, § 16-118(d) (2006). 
186. See MD. CODE ANN., TRANsp. § 16-1l9(d)(l)(ii) (2006). 
187. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-311(1) (2006). 
2007] AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 695 
significantly impairs a person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle is seen 
in the Montana reporting provisions. 188 Other states expand the reporting 
provisions to optometrists and psychiatrists in Rhode Island,189 and 
psychologists in Arizona and North Carolina. 190 The most inclusive reporting 
provision is seen in Louisiana, whereby any family member having first-hand 
knowledge of any condition relating to safe driving may report with the 
Department of Public Safety.191 
The "what" of the reporting provisions generally includes a physical or 
mental condition that, in the physician's judgment, will significantly impair a 
person's ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. 192 
The "when" of the reporting scheme is generally upon the physician's 
report. 193 The Department of Public Safety sends written notification to the 
allegedly impaired driver requiring submission to a medical examination. 194 
Louisiana requires the medical exam be completed within thirty days.195 
The "where" of the process is generally to the MAB within each state, as 
is seen in Texas and Rhode Island. 196 The MAB in most states serves as an 
advisory panel to the division of motor vehicles on the subject of physical and 
mental fitness standards for licensure to operate a motor vehicle and eligibility 
standards for disability parking privileges. 197 
The "why" of the reporting system is to ensure that all persons, including 
those individuals with physical or mental disabilities can safely operate a 
motor vehicle. The safety of all citizens is the overarching responsibility of 
the state motor vehicle administration. Accordingly, a balance is struck 
between providing a comprehensive and fair licensing procedure that allows 
all drivers who can safely operate a motor vehicle to enjoy the opportunity for 
independence and freedom while limiting unsafe drivers from that same 
opportunity. 
The ability of the division of motor vehicles to re-test individuals with a 
psychological or physical impairment that adversely impacts one's ability to 
safely operate a motor vehicle was challenged as discriminatory toward the 
disabled under the ADA in Theriault v. Flynn. 198 The driver, an individual 
188. [d. 
189. R.I. GEN. LAws, § 31-1044(c) (2007). 
190. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 28·3005 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-9.1 (2006). 
191. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40: 1356(E)(I) (2006). 
192. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-2-311 (2006). 
193. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1356 (2006). 
194. [d. 
195. [d. § (E)(3). 
196. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12.096 (2006); see also R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-1044 (2007). 
197. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-1044 (a) (2007). 
198. Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998). 
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who had cerebral palsy and was a wheelchair user, claimed that re-testing for 
disabled individuals impermissibly placed on him additional burdens simply 
because of his disability status. l99 In rejecting the discrimination claim, the 
court articulated that the triggering criteria for re-testing was not limited to 
conditions of disability, but to any reason to believe an applicant may pose a 
risk to public safety.200 The court refused to find disabled individuals are 
singled out for less favorable treatment based only on the fact they are 
disabled.201 The court determined that his "limitation in the use of his 
hands-not his status as a disabled individual or an individual with cerebral 
palsy-that made further inquiry into his driving ability reasonable.,,202 As 
long as the additional re-testing procedure was required to determine whether 
a driver remained qualified to drive, as opposed to setting up barriers for 
participation in a government program, such action is a legitimate basis to 
ensure safe operation of a motor vehicle. 203 
The MAB evaluates and makes recommendations on the driving 
privileges of drivers with physical or mental impairments that may limit their 
ability to drive safely. Medical conditions that require review are 
comprehensively covered in the Texas Medical Advisory Board referral 
process.204 The criteria for referral for physical conditions include:205 
a. Eye disorders 
b. Cardiovascular disorders 
c. Metabolic disorders 
d. Respiratory conditions 
e. Neurological disorders 
Texas' criteria for referral for psychiatric disorders include:206 
199. [d. 
200. [d. at 51. 
201. [d. ADA permits consideration of symptoms or appearance of a disability without activating a 
burden to defend discrimination. 
202. [d. The road test requirement was an individual assessment of his safe driving skills permissible 
within the ADA. See also Briggs v. Walker, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (D. Kan. 2000). Reasonable 
restrictions may be imposed on drivers to assure safe operation of a motor vehicle. 
203. Theriault, 162F.3d at 51; see also Baileyv. Anderson, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (D. Kan. 1999). The 
court permitted an additional driver's instruction program as a result of a driver's vision limitation. The 
court found no violation of the ADA as the requirement was to promote driver safety. 
204. 37 TEx. ADMIN. CODE §15.58(1) (2007). 
205. [d. 
206. [d. at (2). The code includes involuntary psychiatric patients committed to a hospital, those with 
guardians, significant behavioral problems, three alcohol convictions, two accidents while drinking, an 
active drinking problem in past two years, addiction to drugs affecting driver safety, and active drug 
problem. 
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a. Mental, nervous, or emotional patients 
b. Alcohol-induced problems 
c. Drug-induced problems 
In addition, Texas broadly states the "criteria for referral of other conditions 
or disorders ... if [applicants are] under the care of a physician, and a 
qualifying road test confirmed that safe driving ability is considerably affected 
by the condition.,,207 
The medical criteria that the MAB considers in recommendations on a 
driver's ability to operate a motor vehicle safely are succinctly articulated in 
the lllinois Vehicle Code.208 
1) The Driver must possess the emotional and intellectual ability to 
operate a motor vehicle. 
2) The Driver must possess the motor and sensory ability to safely 
operate a motor vehicle. 
3) The Driver must have the ability to sustain consciousness 
throughout the entire interval in which he/she intends to drive. 
4) The Driver must be free from severe pain which could cause 
sudden incapacitation or the inability to control a motor vehicle. 
5) The Driver must be able to meet the vision requirements .... 
6) Driver must not be medicated as to render himselflherself incapable 
of safely operating a motor vehicle.209 
The MAB should use the medical criteria as outlined above plus consideration 
of the driver's past driving record. Additionally, consideration of medication 
or rehabilitative measures that mitigate a driver's impairment should be 
reviewed in determining the safety of the individual driver. 
Upon consideration and review by the MAB, various disposition options 
are available. Broad authority to impose restrictions on drivers to assure safe 
operation of a motor vehicle by the licensee is paramount. According to the 
California Vehicle Code various disposition alternatives are available for 
visually impaired drivers.210 The Department of Motor Vehicles may order 
restrictions that include corrective lens, sunrise to sunset driving only, no 
freeway, area restrictions, additional mirrors, no driving in inclement weather, 
207. [d. at (3). The code includes an amputation, CP, spina bifida, and tourrette syndrome. 
208. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 92, § 1030.18 (2007). 
209. [d. § (b). 
210. CAL.VEH. CODE § 12813 (2006). 
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restricted driving between 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., no driving on roads with 
posted signs of 45 m.p.h. or greater, restricted to certain streets, and specific 
adaptive equipment or prosthesis required. Additional restrictions placed on 
the disabled driver may include suspension, periodic medical evaluations, road 
testing, vision and written testing, geographic restrictions, automatic 
transmission only, power steering, use of hearing aids, and hand control or 
pedal extension. The MAB should be provided with numerous alternatives as 
they evaluate a disabled driver's ability to safely take the wheel. License 
restrictions, periodic evaluations based on individual circumstances with 
solutions based on a case by case determination is the recommended approach. 
The appeal process for the disabled driver whose driving privileges are 
suspended, restricted, or revoked for medical impairments is provided. 
illinois, for example, provides a an opportunity for hearing upon request by 
any person who has their driver's license restricted or cancelled.2I1 The 
administrative appeal process should include a right to a hearing before an 
impartial administrative law judge, due process protections that include timely 
notice of the proceedings, a right to be represented by an attorney, a right to 
present evidence, a right to cross examine opposing witnesses, and a right to 
testify on your own behalf. After the conclusion of the administrative 
proceedings, a driver adversely impacted should be permitted to appeal to 
court. 
X. THE OLDER DRNER 
The public has serious concerns and uneasy feelings about older drivers 
on the road. With approximately 42% of individuals sixty-five years and over 
identified as having a disability, the community concerns of injury to others 
is to be expected.212 In 2003, the percentage of persons age sixty-five and 
older who were licensed drivers was 80%.213 Persons age sixty-five and older 
are relatively safer drivers, having lower rates of crashes than younger drivers, 
the lowest percentage of crashes involving alcohol, and the highest rate of 
seatbelt use of any age groUp.214 However, when compared by crashes per 
mile driven, as opposed to the number of crashes per licensed driver, the data 
reveals a substantial rise in crash incidence after age seventy.21S 
211. 625 ILL. COMPo STAT. 5/6- 905, 906 (2007). The person under review may be required to submit 
to a medical exam and make available at the hearing. 
212. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABllXfY STATUS: 2000, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (Mar. 2003). 
213. Ari N. Houser, Older Drivers and Automobile Safety, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 
2005), http://www.aarp.orglresearchlhousing,...mobility/transportationlfs51r -dri vers.html. 
214. [d. 
215. [d. 
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Medical conditions affecting driving, such as vision, hearing, reaction 
time, and cognitive motor abilities, may account for the increase in accidents 
per mile driven by the older driver.216 For extremely older drivers, age eighty-
five and older, this group saw the second highest rate of fatal crash 
involvement next to the youngest drivers.217 [D]rivers seventy-five and older 
are about 10 percent more likely than 30-59 year olds to be involved in two-
vehicle collisions in which the occupants of the other vehicles suffer non-fatal 
injuries.'ms 
The public outcry about the older driver and safety concerns has led to 
several responses. The importance of balancing the safety of all drivers and 
pedestrians with the older driver's desire to continue to drive cannot be 
overstated. Identifying the unsafe older driver can be accomplished through 
both physician reporting and mandatory road retesting for senior drivers. "The 
most practical and economic way for states to identify older drivers who need 
their driving ability retested ... is through physician reporting."219 An adverse 
result of physician notification is the potential chilling effect that reporting 
might have on the confidential physician patient relationship. 
Another option for the older driver is mandatory road testing after age 
seventy-five, the driver license renewal approach, as is in practice in lllinois, 
New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia.220 States that require renewal 
applicants to appear in person and pass a vision test also vary in length of time 
between renewals, ranging from two to eight years.221 
The complicated and politically sensitive issue of license renewal policy 
requires a federal government response.222 The increase in elderly drivers and 
rise in disabilities among older individuals has created an outcry for a 
measured response to promoting highway safety and respecting an older 
216. Id. 
217. INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY HIGHWAY Loss DATA INSTITUTE, Fatality Facts 
2004: Older People, http://www.iihs.orglresearchlfatalily_facts Ipdfslolderpeople.pdf. 
218. INSURANCE INsTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, STATUS REPORT, Mar. IS, 2003, 
http;llwww.iihs.orglsr/pdfslsr3803.pdf. But teenage drivers have higher rates of injury to other people. See 
also Waschek v. DMV, 59 Cal. App. 4th 640 (1997) (holding the DMV not liable to third parties injured 
by a driver that the DMV issued a license to when the driver found able to safely operate motor vehicle). 
219. Vasiliki L. Tripodis, Licensing Policies For Older Drivers: Balancing Public Safety With 
Individual Mobility, 38 B.C. L. REv. 1051, 1082 (1997). It is noted that Maine and Pennsylvania have 
mandatory reporting. See Papelian v. State of Cali fomi a, 65 Cal. App. 3d 958 (1972) (DMV not liable for 
issuing driver's license who injure 3rd party). 
220. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, US Driver Licensing Procedures for Older Drivers (April 
2006), http://www.iihs.orgllawslstate_lawsloldecdrivers.html. 
221. Id. 
222. David Rosenfield, From California to Illinois to Florida, Oh My!: The Needfor a More Uniform 
Driver's License Renewal Policy, 12 ELDER L.1. 449 (2004) (arguing for a federal mandate for license 
renewal). The article also addresses states' rights to regulate drivers as well as constitutional rights. See 
id. 
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person's desire for independence, as seen by the driving of one's automobile .. 
For the elderly person claiming that the "driver's license represents a 'passport 
to independence-the last stop before a nursing home'" is real.223 The political 
pressure by such organizations that represent retired persons and automobile 
drivers has made mandatory licensing policies for older drivers uncommon. 
The need for a comprehensive approach to license renewal at five year 
intervals commencing at age sixty-five is recommended. It is recommended 
that road tests and medical questions related to the driver's ability to safely 
drive a vehicle are employed to address the safety concerns and the desire for 
continued independence of the disabled driver. 
XI. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has successfully championed 
protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities through lawsuits and 
settlement agreements. 224 Because lawsuits can become quite costly and 
extremely time consuming, the DOJ may opt to resolve cases through written 
settlement agreements.225 In fact, the DOJ is required to negotiate a settlement 
before filing suit. 226 The DOJ has entered into many settlement agreements 
with places of public accommodations that violate the ADA regulations for 
parking and accessibility for disabled drivers.227 Included in these agreements 
are accommodations such as access ramps, appropriate signage, and accessible 
parking spaces in close proximity to the entrance of the facility.228 
In the settlement agreement between the United States of America and 
Poplarville Plaza, the shopping center agreed to designate parking spaces for 
individuals with disabilities close to the entrances of the businesses, construct 
curbs with lips no higher than ~ of an inch, modify a sidewalk ramp to comply 
with the ADA standards for slope, construct handrails on the ramp, and mark 
accessible routes from the designated parking spaces to the sidewalk as 
pedestrian crosswalks.229 Other ADA violators similarly agreed to designate 
parking for individuals with disabilities, include van accessible parking spaces, 
and incorporate appropriate signage, which must be high enough so it is not 
223. [d. at 472 n.169 (quoting Jennifer L. Klein. Elderly Drivers: The Need for Tailored License 
Renewal Procedures. 3 EwERL.J. 309. 329 (1995» . 
. 224. U.S. Dept. of Justice. Enforcing the ADA: A Status Report/rom the Department of Justice 2. 
Issue 2 (Apr.-June 2004). 
225. See id. at 4. 
226. [d. at 2. 
227. [d. at 6-7. 
228. See id. 
229. Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Poplarville Plaza, DOJ 
complaint no. 202-41-34. http://www.usdoj.govlcrtlfoialmissipoplarpl.html. 
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blocked by a parked vehicle.230 In addition to adding accessible parking, 
ramps, or other accommodations for individuals with disabilities, the DOJ may 
also require parties that violate the ADA to remove architectural barriers and 
policies that limit access to facilities. 231 In the settlement agreement between 
the United States of America and the Baltimore Ravens Limited Partnership, 
the NFL Ravens agreed to modify policies regarding accessible parking for 
disabled drivers who have club level or suite seating at the football stadium 
and to train employees on the modified policies and the location of accessible 
parking.232 The DOJ settlement agreements often include the time frame in 
which the modifications must be made, as well as civil penalties and 
compensatory damages for the violations.233 As an alternative to civil penalties 
or compensatory damages, some offending parties have agreed to make 
donations to non-profit disability groupS.234 The DOJ is an important tool in 
enforcing the rights afforded to persons with disabilities in the area of access 
and parking. 
xn. CRIMINAL LlABll..ITY OF THE RECKLESS DISABLED DRIVER 
Is the disabled driver who is involved in a motor vehicle collision simply 
an unavoidable accident or one with criminal CUlpability? How is the driver's 
general duty to exercise ordinary, reasonable care impacted when the disabled 
driver suddenly and unexpectedly has a loss of consciousness? In contrast, 
what are the legal implications when the disabled driver has knowledge of his 
medical condition, warned by his physician not to drive, and, against medical 
advice, gets behind the wheel? 
What about the driver with a diagnosis of epilepsy, but seizure-free for 
a significant period of time, who unexpectedly suffers a seizure while driving? 
What are the legal consequences to the disabled driver who suffers blackouts, 
loss of consciousness, or blurred vision which are a result of medication side 
effects? When, if at all, are individuals held civilly or criminally liable for 
230. See Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Village Developers. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialindvillagedevel.html. 
231. Settlement Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Between the United States of 
America and the Owners and Operators of the Airlie Conference Center. DOJ complaint no. 202-79-34. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtladalairlie.htm. 
232. Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the Baltimore Ravens Limited 
Partnership Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Concerning Accessible Parking at the 
PSINeT Stadium Located in Baltimore. Maryland. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtladalbravens.htm#anchor262953. 
233. See Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and Michael Gindling. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialdairypt.txt. 
234. See Settlement Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Between the United States 
of America and Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon. Inc .• http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlfoialfl8.txt. 
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reckless or negligent actions that cause injury to others while driving? Courts 
appear to be split on the question. _ 
In Robertson v. State, a Texas court was confronted with a driver who 
suffered from a grand mal seizure, lost control of his car, and killed a nine-
year-old girl. 235 The court faced the question of whether the driver recognized 
the imminent danger and had a conscious and "unjustifiable disregard of that 
danger when he decided to drive his car prior to the fatal action.,,236 The 
recklessness of the driver was presented in three phases: failure to take the 
prescription anti-epileptic medication, driving against medical instruction, and 
driving with knowledge of his seizures.237 The driver was convicted of 
manslaughter by a jury and the appeals court noted that the driver's history of 
past auto accidents caused by seizures shows a conscious disregard of the 
danger to other motorists and the public based on such knowledge.238 
Another court finding criminal culpability on the .part of the disabled 
driver was handed down in State v. Jenkins.239 The jury convicted the driver 
of two counts of involuntary manslaughter and of making false infonnation 
following a fatal traffic accident. 240 The prosecutor's theory was that the 
driver, knowing his propensity for epileptic seizures, including 
recommendations by his physician not to drive, endangered other drivers.241 
The reckless conduct by the driver was described by the court as conduct that 
shows a realization of the imminence of danger to another and a conscious and 
unjustifiable disregard of that danger.242 The knowledge of the imminent 
danger created by the epilepsy before driving and conscious disregard knowing 
of his propensity to have seizures was the focal point for the jury.243 
In Commonwealth v. Cheatham, the appeals court examined the 
conviction of homicide by vehicle in the case of a driver who blacked out 
235. Robertson v. State, 109 S.W.3d 13, 14 (Tex. Ct. App. 2(03). 
236. [d. at 19. 
237. [d. The reckless actions of driver demonstrate criminal CUlpability. See id. at 20-21. 
238. [d. at 14, 21. The driver was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 15 years in prison. 
[d. at 14. 
239. State v. Jenkins, 39 P.3d 47 (Kan. 2(02). 
240. [d. at 51. 
241. [d. The auto accident killed two children. [d. The state presented evidence of seven prior auto 
accidents of driver. [d. 
242. Jenkins, 39 P.3d at 54. This is also described as gross negligence, culpable negligence, wanton 
negligence. [d. See also People v. Eckert, 138 N.E.2d 794 (N.Y. 1956) (driver's prior knowledge of risk 
of driving was reckless driving). 
243. Jenkins, 39 P.3d at 54., The seizure was not a surprise to the driver. /d. See also State v 
Freeman, C.C.A. No. 02COI-9406-CR-OOI13, 1995 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 119 (February 15, 1995) 
(driver convicted of criminally negligent homicide; driver suffered a seizure and court found a gross 
deviation from standard of care by driver's choice of operating motor vehicle knowing she was prone to 
epileptic seizures when not taking her medication). 
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while driving.244 The driver had a history of seizure disorder, was taking 
medication for such seizures, and had a prior seizure three and a half months 
prior to the incident.245 The court examined whether the driver's actions 
constituted conduct raised to the level of a gross deviation from the standard 
of care a reasonable person would observe.246 In concluding that the driver's 
conduct was sufficiently reckless and wanton to rise to a level of criminal 
culpability, the court focused on the driver's knowledge of the frequency of his 
seizures and that even with medication his seizures came on without warning, 
"and he knew that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania required that he be 
seizure-free for one year before being licensed to drive.,,247 Despite such 
knowledge, as well as his license being suspended, he chose to drive.248 
The significance of the knowledge a driver possesses, especially in regard 
to his medical condition and the risks associated with driving, are key factors 
in assessing criminal cUlpability. The awareness of a condition which a driver 
knows may produce an automobile collision and such disregard of the 
consequences renders the driver liable for culpable negligence.249 
The significance of a driver's history of epilepsy, the nature of such 
seizures, and the risks involved are key in determining the culpability of a 
driver. In Knight v. Miller, the driver who claimed her loss of consciousness, 
which resulted from an epileptic seizure, was sudden and unforeseeable was 
rebuked.250 The court determined that the driver failed to show her loss of 
consciousness was unforeseeable.251 The civil rather than criminal penalty 
assessed to the driver is the route taken in many such cases; here a monetary 
judgment was the result.252 
The criminal culpability is much less certain for the driver who 
experiences an unexpected or unforeseen medical emergency. In Roman v. 
Estate of Gobbo, the driver suffered an incapacitating heart attack, which he 
244. Commonwealth v. Cheatham, 615 A.2d 802 (Pa. Super Ct. 1992). The driverlost control of the 
car hitting three children sitting on a fence killing one and injuring two others. [d. at 803. 
245. [d. 
246. [d. at 806. 
247. [d. at 807. 
248. [d. That conduct was a gross deviation from standard of care of a reasonable person. 
249. See People v Decina, 138 N.E.2d 799, 804 (N.Y. 1956). This case is distinguished from the 
situation of a sudden sleeping spell or unexpected heart attack because here there was prior knowledge of 
the driver's condition. [d. at 804. 
250. Knight v. Miller, 503 So.2d 120 (La. Ct. App. 1987). The driver had a medical history of 
epilepsy since age 10. [d. at 122. 
251. [d. at 124. 
252. [d. at 121. The injured person was awarded $22,000 in compensation. [d. See also Bashi v. 
Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 635 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (mental illness of driver does not preclude financial 
responsibility). 
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had no reason to anticipate or foresee, and was suddenly stricken with a period 
of unconsciousness, rendering it impossible to control his car.253 
The sudden and unforeseen loss of consciousness due to a ftrst time 
epileptic seizure was evidenced in the case of Solorio v. United States. 254 The 
driver's seizure was not reasonably foreseeable to prevent the accident, thus 
beyond the control of the driver.255 The reasonable prudent man standard is 
outlined in the case of Goodrich v. Blair, in which an eighty year old driver 
suffered a sudden heart attack, causing his vehicle to cross the median into 
oncoming trafftc, injuring several individuals.256 The court noted that the key 
point of inquiry is the decision to drive at all.257 The court stated, 
[i]f the defendant's health was such that a reasonably prudent man 
would not risk driving a car, then the defendant is negligent by merely 
undertaking the task of driving, regardless of subsequent events .. If, 
on the other hand, a person is not negligent in choosing to drive his 
car, then he is not negligent when he loses control of that car due to 
a heart attack. 258 
Another key factor in assessing the driver's culpability is foreseeability. 
According to Deason v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the 
driver who "suddenly loses consciousness from an unforeseen cause, and is 
unable to control the vehicle, is not chargeable with negligence.,,259 The 
"exception to the general rule exists where a person knows that he is suffering 
from an illness which will likely cause his loss of consciousness.,,260 When a 
driver with a medical condition possesses the knowledge of his situation and 
consciously chooses to ignore the risk to the public, criminal culpability will 
253. Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio 2(03). The negligence of the driver was 
excused. 
254. Solorio v. U.S., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D. Utah 2002). 
255. See id. at 1283-85. A driver is only liable for negligence for actions he should have foreseen. 
[d. at 1283. 
256. Goodrich v. Blair, 646 P.2d 890 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). The driver was pronounced dead from 
a coronary occlusion. [d. at 892. It was determined his sudden incapacity made him no liable for conduct. 
[d. 
257. [d. at 892. 
258. [d. The jury concluded driver's heart attack not reasonably foreseeable at time he chose to drive. 
[d. 
259. Deason v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 209 So.2d 576,577 (La. Ct. App. 1967). The 
driver had a heart attack while driving, but the court stated that a sudden loss of consciousness is a complete 
defense to negligence if it is not foreseeable. [d. 
260. Moore v. Presnell, 379 A.2d 1246, 1248 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). A driver with history of 
cardiac problems was involved in an auto accident, and the driver, with such knowledge of his condition, 
drives anyway. See id. at 1246. See also Williams v. Frohock, 114 So.2d 221 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959) (driver 
excused from negligence when he suddenly blacks out with no warning of his condition). 
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arise. Failing to demonstrate such knowledge on the part of the driver should 
preclude criminal culpability. 
The sudden and unforeseeable loss of consciousness by a driver that 
results in a vehicular accident should be a complete defense to a claim based 
on civil or criminal negligence. The knowledge of a driver's medical 
condition and resulting risk of blackout or loss of consciousness are the key 
turning points to culpability. The duty to exercise reasonable care and good 
judgment while driving are the cornerstones of safe driving. When a driver 
knows the loss of his ability to safely and properly operate and control the 
vehicle, the driver should be legally responsible for all injuries to others as a 
proximate result of the driver's failure to operate his vehicle. 
XIV. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
The Fair Housing Act ("FHA") was enacted to provide for fair housing 
throughout the United States, and to make it illegal to discriminate against any 
person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or 
in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, 
because of a handicap.261 The housing discrimination law prohibits any person 
from refusing "to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, 
practices or services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford 
such [disabled] person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling" unit, 
including public and common use areas.262 
The FHA was utilized in the case of Gittleman v. Woodhaven 
Condominium Ass'n, in which a condominium owner with a disability 
requested exclusive use of a parking space to accommodate his disability.263 
Although the court acknowledged that parking spaces are owned by the 
condominium unit owners as tenants in common in its Master Deed, the 
provisions are subject to the purview of the FHA, which in this case, finds the 
denial of accessible parking a discriminatory and unlawful act. 264 The court 
clearly articulated that such actions by the condominium in refusing to make 
reasonable accommodations to afford such person equal opportunity to use and 
enjoy a dwelling were discrimination under the FHA.265 
261. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000). The Act uses the term handicap, which is defined substantially 
the same as the term disability within the ADA. 
262. [d. § 3604(f)(3)(B);. See also 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.204, 100.201 (2006) (accessible route which 
includes parking access aisles). 
263. Gittleman v. Woodhaven Condominium Assoc., Inc., 972 F.Supp. 894, 895 (D.N.I. 1997). 
264. [d. at 899-900. 
265. [d. at 903. Without the reserved parking space, plaintiff might be unable to live in Progress 
Gardens at all. [d. 
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In Shapiro v Cadman Towers, Inc., a disabled person with multiple 
sclerosis successfully obtained a parking space on the ground floor of her 
building's parking garage.266 Relying on the FHA, the court required the 
apartment complex to incur reasonable costs to accommodate Shapiro's 
handicap in order for her to use and enjoy her dwelling.267 
In certain instances, disabled individuals seek accessible parking spaces 
in front of their home on a public street, as was seen in Trovato v. City of 
Manchester. 268 Sylvia Trovato and her daughter filed a complaint against the 
City of Manchester, New Hampshire for the purpose of building a paved 
parking space in front of their home.269 The court's analysis of the financial 
or administrative burden of disrupting the neighborhood and the benefit to the 
disabled home owner resulted in the conclusion that the parking request was 
a reasonable accommodation required by the FHA.270 Although an apartment 
complex is not required to designate a particular space for a disabled tenant, 
the FHA does mandate a disabled tenant should be able to park sufficiently 
near her apartment so as to equalize her opportunity to use and enjoy her 
dwelling.271 
The FHA can be successfully utilized by disabled individuals who simply 
seek accessible parking in close proximity to where they live. The provision 
of designated accessible parking spaces in private apartment complexes and 
condominium settings is vital to allowing disabled individuals an "equality of 
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency" as stated in the ADA.272 
XV. CONCLUSION 
The rights of the disabled driver have advanced considerably since the 
enactment of the ADA. Reserved parking spaces are often provided so an 
individual with a disability may access goods, services, and employment 
opportunities. However, there continues to be a lack of sufficient accessible 
266. Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 1995). 
267. [d. at 335. They have to provide such accommodation so long as it does not pose undue 
hardship and substantial burden and does not displace existing residents. [d. See also Lyons v. Legal Aid 
Society, 68 F.3d 1512 (2d Cir. 1995). 
268. Trovato v. City of Manchester, 992 F.Supp. 493, 495 (D.N.H. 1997). 
269. [d. at 495. 
270. [d. at 498. 
271. Hubbard v Samson Mgrnt. Corp. 994 F.Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). See also Jankowski Lee 
&Assocs. v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 1996) (apartment required to provide parking space close to 
building for disabled tenant as is required by reasonable accommodation of FHA). The number of 
accessible parking spaces provided at the apartment complex is a question of fact dependant on the number 
of disabled tenants seeking parking spaces. [d. at 895-96. 
272. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). 
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parking spaces for the disabled and the signage deficiencies exacerbate the 
problem. Only time will tell if the battle cry of "you take my space, I take 
your air" will again be heard as the disabled driver seeks accessible parking 
and the non-disabled driver grabs the closest parking spot for just a minute. 
The Medical Advisory Board of the state's Motor Vehicle Administration 
must continue to be diligent in monitoring disabled drivers who can safely 
drive on the road. The MAB's role is crucial in providing a comprehensive, 
careful, and equitable process for monitoring, overseeing, and ensuring 
confidentiality in its oversight role. 
The reasonable and fair balancing act between the safety concerns of the 
community at large and the rights of the disabled driver to operate a motor 
vehicle to access places of public accommodation must be struck. The ADA 
mandate designed to open up doors to allow the disabled driver to enter are a 
sterling example of the possibilities. Parking one's car in a safe and accessible 
space is a crucial prerequisite to access inside the public accommodation and 
an opportunity to participate in the mainstream of society. 
On the horizon for the disabled driver are physician's reporting 
obligations to the Motor Vehicle Administration regarding disabled drivers. 
Also, with the population of older Americans with disabilities on the rise, the 
retesting of drivers at age 65 or over will continue to pose challenges for our 
community. The ability to drive on the highway is part of the American 
dream, demonstrating independence and freedom. Hopefully, the public will 
allow full and complete access for all places open to the public. 
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Appendix A 
2005·2006 Disability Parking Survey 
Survey completed by ____________ Date _____ _ 
Name and address of public accommodation surveyed: 
CIRCLE the number of the category of the public accommodation 
surveyed 
"Place of public accommodation means a facility, operated by a private entity 
whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the following 
categories:" 
1. An inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an 
establishment located within a building that contains not more than five 
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of 
the establishment as the residence of the proprietor; 
2. A restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; 
3. A motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of 
exhibition or public entertainment; 
4. An auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public 
gathering; 
5. A bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, 
or other sales or rental establishment; 
6. A laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, 
shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or 
lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care 
provider, hospital, or other service establishment; 
7. A terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public 
transportation; 
8. A museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection; 
9. A park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
10. A nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private 
school, or other place of education; 
11 A day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, 
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; 
12 A gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of 
exercise or recreation. 
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Helpful information for completing the survey 
A. A tape measure is needed to complete this survey. 
B. Definitions: 
1. Accessible space = parking space must have sufficient space 
alongside the vehicle ("access aisle") so that persons using mobility 
aids, e.g. wheelchairs, can transfer and maneuver to and from the 
vehicle. Accessible parking spaces also require the appropriate 
designation (sign or marking with access symbol) and locations of 
spaces (closest to facility entrance as possible) and their connection to 
an accessible route. 
2. Access aisle = space alongside the vehicle for persons using mobility 
aids to transfer and maneuver in and out of and to and from the 
vehicle 
3. Accessible route = pathway from access aisle to accessible entrance 
of facility 
c. Diagram: Dimensions of Parking Spaces 
Standard/Car Van 
96 .. in 60 min 98 II'IIin 96 mill 
wo 
252 mIn 
(a) 
v,;n Access/111ft SpiN al End ROIN 
FIg. A!i 
P6rk,ng Space Alt<:=mGtlv~ 
1. A standard accessible space is 8 feet (96") wide plus a 5 
foot (60") access aisle, for a total of 13 feet.(146"). 
2. A van accessible space is 8 feet (96") wide plus an 8 foot 
(96") access aisle, for a total of 16 feet (192"). 
3. The accessible route connected to the access aisle at the front 
of the parking spaces must be a minimum of 3 feet (36"). 
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Disability Parking Survey 
1. Does the facility have a parking lot on the premises? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
2. Is there one or more off-street parking space either permanently or 
temporarily assigned for people with disabilities? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
*** If the answer to question 1 is NO, and the answer to question 2 is 
YES, skip to question 12*** 
3. How many accessible spaces (i.e. access aisle, designation, close 
proximity to entrance, and accessible route requirements are all present; 
refer to definition on page 2) are in the parking lot? __ _ 
4. If parking spaces meet some but not all of the four requirements of an 
accessible space, CIRCLE those that are deficient: 
a. access aisle 
b. designation 
c. location/close proximity to entrance 
d. accessible route 
5. Based on the chart below, is the minimum required number of accessible 
parking spaces available? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
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In the chart below, CIRCLE the range of total spaces in the lot. 
Total Parking Required 
In Lot Minimum Number 
of Accessible Spaces 
1 to 25 1 
26 to SO 2 
51 to 75 3 
76 to 100 4 
101 to 150 5 
151 to 200 6 
201 to 300 7 
301 to 400 8 
401 to 500 9 
501 to 1000 2 percent of total 
1001 and over 20, plus 1 for each 
100 over 1000 
6. Is there at least one parking space that is van accessible (refer to page 2)? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
7. How many of the accessible spaces are van accessible? ____ _ 
8. Are the accessible parking spaces, including van spaces, at least 96 inches 
(8 feet) wide with an access aisle (two spaces may share a common 
access aisle; see page 2)? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
9. If the parking space is designated as "van accessible," is the adjacent 
access aisle at least 96 inches (8 feet) wide (refer to diagram on page 2)? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
10. Are all other access aisles at least 60 inches (5 feet) wide (refer to 
diagram on page 2)? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
11. Are the access aisles, which run the length of the parking space and are 
indicated by cross-hatching (see diagram on page 2), part of the 
accessible route to the accessible entrance? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
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12. Is the parking area surface smooth and slip-resistant (e.g. concrete or 
asphalt; not gravel)? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
13. Are there any obstructions (For example: snow, sand, trash cans, grocery 
carts) in the accessible spaces or access aisles? . 
Circle: YES or NO. 
If YES, what are the obstructions? 
14. Is there at least one accessible route to the accessible entrance? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
a. To the maximum extent possible, does it coincide with the route for 
the general public? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
b. Is the accessible route a minimum width of 36"? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
15. Whenever an accessible route crosses a curb, there must be a ramp. Is the 
slope of the ramp, from the parking lot to the sidewalk, no greater than 
1:12? (See explanation below) 
Circle: YES or NO 
• Slope is given as a ratio of the height to the length. 1:12 means for 
every 12 inches along the base of the ramp, the height increases one 
inch. For a 1: 12 maximum slope, at least one foot of ramp length is 
need for each inch of height. 
16. Are the accessible spaces the closest parking spaces to the accessible 
entrance? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
17. Are accessible spaces marked with the International Symbol of 
Accessibility? 
Circle: YES or NO 
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18. Are van accessible spaces marked with "Van Accessible" signs? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
19. Are there signs in front of the aisle of van accessible spaces indicating 
"No parking in access aisle"? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
a. If the sign is flushed against a building, is it at least 6 feet high, but no 
more than 10? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
b. If the sign is not flushed against a building, is it at least 7 feet high? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
20. Does the sign indicate the maximum fine for parking illegally in the 
accessible space? 
Circle: YES or NO. 
H yes, what is the fine? _______ _ 
21. At the time of completing this survey, how many vehicles are parked in 
the accessible spaces? ______ _ 
a. Of those, how many are lawfully parked? _____ _ 
"Lawfully" means the vehicle contains a disabled designation on the 
license plate or a valid, current (Le. not expired), placard hanging 
from the rearview mirror. 
b. How many vehicles, are unlawfully parked? ____ _ 
I understand that this questionnaire that I am completing for Donald H. Stone 
will be used for his research and scholarly writing. I give Professor Stone 
permission to use direct quotations from this questionnaire at his discretion. 
I understand that I will retain anonymity in the writing of this article. 
Date: Name: _________ Telephone: _____ _ 
(Please Print) 
Address: 
Email Address: _______________ _ 
Signature: ___________________ _ 
